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The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism:
The Tug of War Within
--Erin Ryan, Associate Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon, U.S.A;
Fulbright Professor of Law, Zhongguo Haiyang Daxue (Ocean University), Qingdao, CHINA (2011-12)
Abstract
This essay is drawn from a lecture for the “Ways of Federalism” conference (University of the
Basque Country, October 19, 2011) and a forthcoming book, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN
(Oxford, 2012), which explores how constitutional interpreters struggle to reconcile the core tensions
within American federalism. The essay reviews the current challenges of the American federal system
through the theoretical lens developed in the book, focusing on the role of state-federal bargaining within
the U.S. federal system.
FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN traces American federalism’s internal struggle
through history and into the present, critiquing the Rehnquist Court and Tea Party’s embrace of greater
jurisdictional separation, the limits of New Federalism and Cooperative Federalism approaches, and the
growing disjuncture between federalism theory and practice in the United States. In response to the
ongoing challenges for American federalism posed by constitutional design, the book outlines a theory of
Balanced Federalism, which mediates the core tensions of American federalism on three separate planes:
(1) fostering balance among the competing federalism values, (2) leveraging the functional capacities of
all three branches of government in interpreting federalism, and (3) maximizing the wisdom of both state
and federal actors in so doing. The essay introduces the book’s overarching themes and explores how
well-crafted intergovernmental bargaining provides one means of navigating these core tensions.

1

Introduction: The Once and Future Challenges for American Federalism

This essay reviews the challenges facing the U.S. federal system through the theoretical lens
developed in a forthcoming book, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN.1 It also considers the
opportunities federalism enables, focusing especially on responsive developments in state-federal
intergovernmental bargaining. Part I frames the discussion in terms of American federalism’s inherent
tensions, the perpetual tug of war within.
The dilemmas of American federalism have become especially palpable in recent years, reflecting
the progressing demands on all levels of government to meet the inexorably more complicated challenges
of governance in an increasingly interconnected world.2 Some reflect similar dilemmas in other federalist
societies, while others are unique to our own particular constellation of national, state, and municipal
1

ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (Oxford, 2012). (With apologies to the reader, I note that
citations to the book here cannot include specific page numbers, as the book is still in the final stages of production.
To assist the location of cited material in the final book, I provide detailed parentheticals.)
2
Id. at Chapter Five (discussing interjurisdictionality in governance).
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governance.3 Some federalism dilemmas are of genuine constitutional import, others more sound and
fury—signifying little beyond the substantive political agenda of one interest group or another.4 Each
heralds the potential for real consequences in the political arena—and indeed, these consequences are
what receive the most sustained public attention.
The political consequences of federalism dilemmas are apparent throughout the policy spectrum.
They are visible in the litigation over health care reform efforts that has now reached the United States
Supreme Court5 and in similar battles over environmental governance and climate policy,6 banking and
financial services regulation,7 immigration policy,8 and gay marriage.9 Consequences are also visible in
the emergence of popular constitutional political movements, such as the “Tea Party” 10 and even the
“Tenthers.”11 The latter are named for the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that affirms our
system of dual sovereignty, which divides sovereign authority between local and national government at
the state and federal levels.12 After decades of playing a merely supporting role in U.S. federalism
theory,13 the Tenth Amendment has emerged as a passionate site of political contest, rallying advocates
for state right-to-die legislation,14 home schooling,15 and sectarian education,16 and among opponents of

3

Cf. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 Int'l J.
Const. L. 91, 93-96 (2004) (exploring points of comparison and points of singularity among federal systems).
4
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.
910-14 (1994) (reviewing opportunistic invocation of federalism ideals in political debates throughout history); Neal
Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131, 133-35 (2004) (same).
5
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Virginia v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-CV-188 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010)
(arguing that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590 of March 2010, exceeds federal power
under the Commerce and General Welfare Clauses and conflicts with state law); Complaint, Florida v. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2010) (similar challenge in a suit joined by more than a
dozen other states); Complaint, Shreeve v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv-71 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 8, 2010) (similar suit).
6
See, e.g., Brian Roberts, Welcome to the Constitutional Crisis, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, Apr. 27, 2010,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/04/27/welcome-to-the-constitutional-crisis/ (reporting on states’ rights
challenges to federal authority for proposed climate and financial reform legislation, among other bills).
7
Id.
8
United States v. Arizona, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75558 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010).
9
E.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT, 21-36 (D. Mass.
July 7, 2010) (holding that the federal Defense of Marriage Act violates the Tenth Amendment).
10
See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html (reporting on Tea Party support for ‘state’s rights’ initiatives.)
11
See Rick Montes, What is a Tenther?, NEW YORK TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER (2010),
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/05/06/what-is-a-tenther/ (defining the movement); Radley Balko, The
"Tenther" Smear, REASON.COM, Sept, 21, 2009, http://reason.com/blog/2009/09/21/the-tenther-smear (defending the
movement).
12
U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
13
RYAN, supra note 1, at Introduction (discussing the evolving role of Tenth Amendment in federalism analysis) and
Chapter Four (discussing the Supreme Court’s evolving Tenth Amendment jurisprudence).
14
See Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R. Griffith, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: An Analysis and Commentary on the
Emerging Law of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 42 S.D. L. REV. 357, 372 (1997) (arguing that if the Tenth
Amendment requires greater federal deference to states rights, it should also require greater federal deference to
certain individual rights); Emily J. Sovell, Elderly, Be Alert: The Battle Continues over Deathbed Rights, 45 S.D. L.
REV. 670, 675 (2000) (discussing how right-to-die proponents rely on the Tenth Amendment). Cf. Gonzales v.
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Medicaid and Medicare,17 federal gun laws,18 tax collection,19 drivers’ license requirements,20 and the
deployment of National Guard troops abroad.21
The principles of constitutional federalism are invoked in each of these substantive debates over
policy, but the underlying challenge for American federalism—the reason we get so mired in these policy
debates—goes much deeper. In fact, the great underlying challenge for American federalism is the same
one that has preoccupied American jurists for more than two hundred years.22 That underlying problem is
that the U.S. Constitution mandates, but incompletely describes, our system of dual sovereignty.23 This
requires constitutional interpreters to turn to some exogenous, normative theory of federalism—some
philosophy about what federalism is for and how it should work—in order to fill in the blanks that
inevitably arise when vague constitutional directives are applied to actual cases and controversies.
Should the proper relationship between state and federal power approximate the dual federalism
model—characterized by mutually exclusive spheres of separate subject-matter jurisdiction—or is it
better understood in terms of the cooperative federalism model and its emphasis on concurrent
jurisdiction?24 When conflicts arise, should local or national decision-making trump? And which branch
of government is best equipped to resolve the issue: the judiciary or the political branches? Always, the
question is: “who gets to decide?” The state or federal government? Congress or the Court? And for that
matter, what about state and federal executive agencies?25
Without clearer constitutional guidance on the details of federalism theory, the result has been
decades (if not centuries) of vacillating federalism jurisprudence as the nation experiments with different
theoretical models—each with its own advantages and disadvantages, the latest model usually overOregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (upholding the Oregon Death with Dignity Act without directly invoking the Tenth
Amendment but broadly addressing the relationship between state and federal power).
15
See Lynn M. Stuter, Are Public Schools Constitutional?, Jan. 20, 2003,
http://www.newswithviews.com/Stuter/stuter9.htm (arguing that the Tenth Amendment prevents the federal
government from interfering in education).
16
See EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING AND ABORTION 176
(1989) (arguing that the Tenth Amendment reserves state authority to assist sectarian schools and encourage
religious activities in public schools).
17
See supra note 5.
18
Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-20-101 (2009).
19
E.g., State Authority and Tax Fund Act, H.B. 877, 2010 Sess. (Ga. 2010), State Sovereignty Act, H.B. 2810, 2010
Sess. (Okla. 2010); Washington State Sovereignty and Federal Tax Escrow Account of 2010, H.B. 2712, 2010 Sess.
(Wash. 2010).
20
ACLU, Anti-REAL ID Legislation in the States, http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/ (noting that no state met
the December 2009 deadline contemplated by the statute, and over half enacted or considered legislation prohibiting
compliance with the Act, defunding its implementation, or calling for its repeal). See also Anthony D. Romero,
Editorial, Opposing View: Repeal Real ID, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/2007-03-05-opposing-view_N.htm (arguing that REAL ID violates the
Tenth Amendment, destroys dual sovereignty, and makes Americans vulnerable to identity theft).
21
See Kirk Johnson, States’ Rights is Rallying Cry for Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html (reporting on a Utah bill).
22
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter One (describing the interpretive challenge of American federalism); Chapter
Three (tracing it through American constitutional history).
23
Id.; cf. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:
A HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007); ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010).
24
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Three (reviewing dual and cooperative federalism among the various operative
federalism theories in play over the course of American history).
25
For analysis of the textual ambiguity that leads to indeterminacy in U.S. federalism theory, see id. at Chapter One.
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correcting for the errors of its predecessor while introducing new problems of its own.26 Many of these
approaches continued to be claimed on different sides of today’s substantive policy debates about health
care, environment, immigration, and so on. Meanwhile, innovations in multijurisdictional governance
have far outpaced the vernacular of current federalism theory. The relationships between local, state, and
federal actors in all branches of government have become more complicated, more entangled, and in
many respects, more empowered.27
To that end, what American federalism most needs going forward is the development of a more
coherent theoretical approach, one that can better cope with the three fundamental tensions within
American federalism: the tension between the underlying values of federalism, that among the roles of the
three branches of government in interpreting constitutional federalism directives, and that between local
and national wisdom and expertise in implementing federalism ideals.28 These core tensions—the three
individual “tug of war” battles underlying the whole—remain the great unresolved challenges of the U.S.
federal system. They are the ultimate source of the many substantive policy debates regularly framed in
federalism terms. And to meet these challenges, American federalism must undertake three critical tasks.
First, American federalism requires better and more transparent balance between the competing
values of good governance at the heart of American federalism. Indeed, this is the core idea of the book:
that the best way to understand American federalism is in terms of the core values that give federalism
meaning, or the good-governance principles that Americans turn to federalism to help actualize in public
administration. The four of greatest significance are : (1) the checks and balances between local and
national power that protect individuals against overreach or abdication by either sovereign; (2)
accountability and transparency in governance that enables meaningful democratic participation
throughout the jurisdictional spectrum; (3) the protection of local autonomy, innovation, and
interjurisdictional competition of the sort the great federalism “laboratory of ideas” enables;29 and finally
(and most overlooked) (4) the interjurisdictional synergy that federalism enables us to harness between
the unique governing capacity that develops at the local and national levels, needed to address the
different parts of interjurisdictional problems that require response from both.30
The core federalism values are doubtlessly all good things, and we have aspired to each of them
throughout American history. The problem, of course, is that each value is suspended in a web of
tensions with the others—fueling a perpetual “tug of war” for privilege when they conflict. We can’t
always satisfy all of them in any given regulatory context at the same time. For example, the very system
of dual sovereignty that creates checks and balances frustrates governmental transparency, as it would
certainly be easier to follow the lines of accountability in a fully unitary, centralized system! And yet we
willingly accept the compromise to avail ourselves of the benefits of local autonomy and
26

Id. at Chapter Three (reviewing vacillations over the course of American history) and Chapter Four (reviewing
them specifically in the context of the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism jurisprudence).
27
Id. at Parts III and IV (describing opportunities for state-federal collaborative governance). See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2008) (casting federalism as a
means of empowering governance at all levels on the jurisdictional spectrum); ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC
FEDERALISM (2009) (emphasizing the importance of jurisdictional overlap and dynamism in American federalism).
28
See generally RYAN, supra note 1.
29
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (praising the “laboratory
of ideas” enabled by federalism in observing how “a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” ).
30
Id. at Chapter Two (reviewing the intellectual history of these values in federalism theory).
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interjurisdictional synergy associated with federalism, creating deeper opportunities for democractic
participation and effective regulatory response.31 Until now, the discourse has done a poor job of even
recognizing these tensions, let alone providing meaningful guidance for coping with them, leading to the
famously fluctuating approaches to federalist governance over American history.32
The second ongoing challenge is that American federalism requires better balance among the
functional capacities of the different branches of government in interpreting constitutional federalism
directives, in both abstract and concrete circumstances.33 This begins as a rather intuitive point: we all
understand that courts are better at answering certain legal questions and legislatures better at others (and
though the American federalism discourse has been slow to recognize it, even the executive branch brings
some talent to the table). However, the previous American federalism discourse has largely been a “tug
of war” between the proponents of judicial supremacy in federalism interpretation on the one hand34 and
proponents of legislative supremacy on the other.35 To flourish most healthily, American federalism must
afford space for all three branches to contribute what they do best in making sense of the whole.
Indeed—it already does, variously enabling the allocation of contested authority through judicial review,
legislative policymaking, and executive implementation in different federalism-sensitive contexts.36
Federalism theory has just been slow to understand how it all works together.
Finally, American federalism must better maximize the input of local as well as national actors in
allocating contested authority, which, of course, is the ultimate federalism project. This is the most
fundamental “tug of war” of all—the reason for our wrestling with federalism to begin with. After all, if
local decision-making were always best, there would be no need for a strong federation in the first place
(although the failed Articles of Confederation that predated our Constitution suggested otherwise).37
Similarly, if national decision-making were always best, there would also be no need for the federation—
we could have a fully centralized government, like that in China or France.38 But for reasons both
historical and philosophical, American federalism has proven robust in spite of the alternatives. The
critical question is how best to balance the wisdom and interests of the local and national governments
that have remained so robust within our federal system.
A diagnostic view of actual American governance reveals this as an area where federalism
practice has especially outpaced federalism theory.39 Today, local input in federalism decision-making
extends far beyond the canonical device of providing representatives for election to national bodies like
Congress. Instead, there is compelling evidence of ample state and local input on allocating contested
31

Id. (discussing the various tensions and trade-offs between core federalism values).
Id. at Chapter Three (reviewing the overall history of American federalism) and Chapter Four (reviewing the New
Federalism jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court era).
33
Id. at Parts III and IV (reviewing the allocation of federalism interpretive authority among the three branches).
34
E.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J.
75, 128 (2001); William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 782–83, 797–98 (1987).
35
E.g. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 588 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-76 (1980).
36
RYAN, supra note 1, at Parts III and IV (exploring the roles of the branches in interpreting federalism).
37
Id. at Chapter Three (discussing the Articles of Confederation).
38
Id. at Chapter Two.
39
Id. at Part IV (exploring the enterprise of state-federal bargaining).
32
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policy-making and implementation authority in direct negotiations with federal actors, through a variety
of constitutional and statutory frameworks that enable such negotiation to take place.40 The role of
intergovernmental bargaining in federalism interpretation is a fascinating and important development in
federalism theory, which is only just now beginning to attract the scholarly attention it deserves. It is by
no means the only subject of American federalism worthy of study, but in light of its academic debut and
to encourage further such inquiry, it is where I will focus the balance of this essay.
Negotiated federalism, which presents on a continuum from the obvious to the opaque, plays a
surprisingly foundational role in the American system of dual sovereignty. FEDERALISM AND THE TUG
OF WAR WITHIN helps catalog this largely uncharted landscape in a taxonomy of opportunities for statefederal bargaining available within various constitutional and statutory frameworks.41 The full taxonomy
groups them into categories of conventional examples, negotiations to reallocate authority, and joint
policymaking negotiations. It reviews the familiar forms of bargaining used in lawmaking, over law
enforcement, under the federal spending power, and for exceptions under otherwise applicable laws. It
then considers the more interesting (and progressively less obvious) forms of negotiated policymaking,
including negotiated federal rulemaking with state stakeholders, federal statutes that share policy design
with states, iterative programs of joint policymaking that stagger leadership over time, and even
intersystemic signaling negotiations, by which independently operating state and federal actors trade
influence over the direction of evolving interjurisdictional policies.42
This emerging understanding of intergovernmentally negotiated federalism—or “federalism
bargaining,” as we can call it for short—speaks to each of American federalism’s core challenges.43
When federalism bargaining is well-crafted, it creates a legitimate forum for balancing values, functional
governance capacity, and local and national input—all through a bilateral dynamic of governance that
tracks the very purpose of federalism as a dynamic equipoise between local and national decision-making.
Indeed, by incorporating the interests of local, state, and federal actors into negotiated balance,
intergovernmental partnerships can safeguard the objectives of federalism on a structural level that
unilateral policymaking by state or federal actors alone can never accomplish.44
In my forthcoming book and several previous articles, I have explored how state and federal
actors use various forms of bargaining to navigate the federalism challenges that invariably arise in
contexts of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction.45 This essay summarizes that literature, showcasing two

40

Id.
Id. at Chapter Eight (presenting the taxonomy); see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV 1
(2011) (presenting an earlier version).
42
Id.
43
My discussion of federalism bargaining focuses on the vertical federalism relationship within each given array of
state and federal participants. For simplicity, I treat municipal participants in intergovernmental bargaining as state
actors, consistent with the Supreme Court’s inclusion of municipal activity in its Tenth Amendment jurisprudence.
For discussion on how independent municipal activity further complicates the analysis, see id. at Part IV
Introduction and accompanying notes; infra note 132 (quoting the relevant text).
44
Id. at Chapter Ten (contrasting the structural safeguards of bilateral and unilateral interpretation).
45
Id.; see also Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV 1 (2011) (the basis for Chapters Eight, Nine, and
Ten); Erin Ryan, Federalism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth
Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. COLORADO. L. REV. 1 (2010) (the basis for Chapter Seven); Erin Ryan,
Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66
MARYLAND L. REV. 503 (2007) (the basis for parts of several chapters in Parts I and II).
41
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examples of federalism bargaining that demonstrate governance models well suited to the challenges of
negotiating policy among multiple levels of government. The Coastal Zone Management Act enables
broadly negotiated local initiative within a framework of federal law that alternates leadership between
national and local decision-makers over time.46 It provides a good model for governance that matches
broad national goals with policies best implemented at the local level. By contrast, the iterative
policymaking negotiations within the Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating motor vehicle emissions
offers space for limited interjurisdictional competition within a tighter federal framework.47 This
approach serves governance hinging on a national market while preserving space for regulatory
innovation, avoiding the concerns of stagnation and capture associated with regulatory monopoly.
Finally, the essay shows how federalism bargaining enables structural and procedural devices that
can help resolve federalism’s core challenges in a uniquely principled way. Based on these and other
examples, the final section of the essay provides theoretical justification for the role that
intergovernmental bargaining can play in supplementing the unilateral interpretive efforts of the Courts,
Congress, and the Executive to make sense of our ongoing federalism dilemmas. In short, the more (or
less) that federalism bargaining incorporates legitimizing procedures founded on mutual consent and
federalism values, the more (or less) interpretive deference should be accorded its substantive outcome.48
The following discussion provides a digestible introduction to more painstaking analysis in prior
work. Part II of this essay explores the dilemma of jurisdictional overlap within American federalism and
locates the significance of negotiated federalism within the existing U.S. federalism discourse, especially
the ongoing federalism safeguards debate. Part III introduces the federalism bargaining enterprise,
providing highlights from the full taxonomy and examples from the U.S. Coastal Zone Management and
the Clean Air Acts. Part IV explores of the interpretive potential of federalism bargaining that meets
specified procedural criteria associated with fair bargaining and core federalism values. It shows how
well-crafted federalism bargaining, subjected to limited but meaningful judicial review for abuses,
harnesses the appropriate capacity of all branches at all levels of government in jointly navigating the
tensions among federalism values toward good governance.
2

Jurisdictional Overlap, Bilateralism, and the Great Federalism Safeguards Debate

This section explores the zone of concurrent state-federal regulatory jurisdiction that complicates
American federalism. It also reviews the significance of negotiated governance within this zone to the
longstanding debate about which branch of government should resolve regulatory jurisdictional issues.
This analysis precedes the fuller exegesis of intergovernmental bargaining in Part III in order to
demonstrate up front why that exegesis is worth pursuing.
A discussion of the challenges for American federalism necessarily begins with the problem of
jurisdictional overlap that American federalism necessarily creates. This is the “interjurisdictional gray
area” that bridges the clearer realms of exclusive state and federal jurisdiction as delegated by the
Constitution.49 It is from within this gray area that most federalism controversy spawns, and certainly all

46

Coastal Zone Management Act, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–66 (2006).
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(1).
48
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten (detailing this analysis).
49
Id. at Chapter One (reviewing the constitutional basis for jurisdictional overlap) and Chapter Five (exploring the
gray area of overlap). For examples of exclusive delegations bridged by this gray area, see infra note 54.
47
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that is currently occupying front page news. Simply stated, zones of jurisdictional overlap are those
regulatory contexts in which both the local and national governments have some legitimate regulatory
interest or obligations at the same time. Sovereign interests and obligations arise from constitutional
delegations of federal responsibility and the remaining reservoir of police power constitutionally reserved
to the states, but many are triggered by related subject matter areas of law.50 For example, the
Constitution explicitly delegates responsibility for uniform national bankruptcy laws to the federal
government, but the administration of federal bankruptcy nevertheless relies on state law definitions of
property.51 In the United States, there are many such areas of overlap, from criminal law to financial
services regulation, from national security to public health law.52
For example, in the context of environmental law, jurisdictional overlap often arises because of
the way that many environmental problems partner a need for locally-based land use authority (to police
the individual sources of an environmental harm) with nationally-based Commerce Clause authority (to
manage boundary-crossing or spillover effects of these harms). The problem of regulating water
pollution provides a classic example. Harmful stream sedimentation by a local construction project may
be best regulated through a municipal construction permitting process—but if that fails, it will cause
problems for downstream communities in other states without direct control over out-of-state
permitting.53 For other health and safety regulations, the same relationship plays out between the states’
traditional police power to protect the health and safety of their citizens and the need for federal law to
protect the public in other states.
In light of such overlapping sovereign interests, controversy often arises in these circumstances
over which sovereign should be able to make which regulatory choices. This, after all, is the ultimate
federalism inquiry: “who gets to decide?”—the state or federal government? To be sure, the Constitution
provides valuable guidance about the issue, clearly enumerating some powers to the federal government
(such as the power to declare war) and reserving others to the states (such the management of elections).54
Even so, American federalism gives rise to two primary kinds of uncertainty, leading to so many of the
substantive debates in the news.
Sometimes, there is uncertainty about the actual boundary line between realms of state and
federal jurisdiction, in contexts where we think there may actually be a bright line separating them. For
example, controversy of this variety has erupted over the boundary between state and federal reach over
matters relating to immigration. The Constitution requires the federal government to establish uniform
rules of naturalization, but several states have enacted new laws that, while not administering immigration
directly, govern immigration-related activity by state businesses and law enforcement agencies.55
Arizona’s controversial legislation is currently the subject of a lawsuit by the U.S. Department of Justice,
50

U.S. CONST. amend X.; RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter One (discussing indeterminacy among the details of
constitutional delegations) and Chapter Five (discussing jurisdictional overlap in detail).
51
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (delegating bankruptcy administration to the federal government); Felicia Anne Nadborny,
Note, “Leap of Faith” into Bankruptcy: An Examination of the Issues Surrounding the Valuation of a Catholic
Diocese’s Bankruptcy Estate, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 839, 889 (2005) (discussing the role of state law).
52
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Five (demonstrating overlap in multiple areas of regulatory law).
53
Id. (reviewing the interjurisdictional problem of watershed-wide pollution control).
54
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8 (empowering Congress to declare war); art. I, sec. 4 (delegating responsibility for the
mechanics of congressional elections to state legislatures). See also RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter One.
55
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; United States v. Arizona, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75558 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010)
(describing Arizona’s controversial immigration-related law).
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which seeks to invalidate the state measures as preempted by federal law.56 Related controversy has been
playing out in more than a decade of litigation over the proper boundary between state and federal
authority over wetlands regulation.57 Beginning with a 2001 case in which an Illinois municipal agency
successfully sued to invalidate federal authority over certain intrastate wetlands,58 the boundary-drawing
problem went on to embroil the U.S. Supreme Court in one of its most fractured opinions ever, Rapanos
v. United States, which failed to produce a majority view despite four separate opinions.59
In other contexts, we are more comfortable with the idea of concurrent jurisdiction and less
interested in drawing bright line boundaries between state and federal reach, as demonstrated by general
complacency with overlapping state and federal criminal laws60 or cooperative state-federal management
of national highways.61 Yet uncertainty nevertheless surfaces when conflicts arise between state and
federal choices in this gray area—and then the question becomes “who should trump?” Regarding
criminal or environmental law enforcement, for example, should national objectives preempt, or should
local priorities prevail?62 Once again, the Constitution provides important guidance through the
Supremacy Clause, which clarifies that legitimate exercise of federal authority may always trump
conflicting state law.63 Even so, the federal government often leaves purposeful space for local
participation even when it could theoretically preempt the regulatory field from top to bottom under one
of its enumerated powers, usually for the sake of some special regulatory expertise or capacity that local

56

Id.; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Citing Conflict with Federal Law, Department of
Justice Challenges Arizona Immigration Law (July 6, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-opa776.html (arguing that the Arizona law exceeds a state’s role with respect to aliens, interferes with the federal
administration of the immigration laws, and critically undermines U.S. foreign policy objectives).
57
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Five (discussing the interjurisdictional problem of wetlands regulation).
58
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001)
(limiting federal authority over “hydrologically isolated” wetlands).
59
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006) (casting further doubt on the reach of federal regulatory
authority over wetlands without direct surface connections to navigable waters). Strictly speaking, Solid Waste
Agency and Rapanos were both statutory decisions interpreting the Clean Water Act. However, the Justices and
their observers clearly understood their task of statutory interpretation as taking place in the looming shadow of
ongoing debate over the reach of federal Commerce Clause authority.
60
See Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in Crime Fighting, 86
B.U. L. REV. 65, 104–06 (2006); Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1541, 1553 (2002).
61
The National Highway System is jointly administered by the states and federal government. Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374 (June 29, 1956).
62
E.g., Logan, supra note 60 at 104–06 (questioning the increasing federalization of criminal law); Jonathan H.
Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 172-73 (2005)
(questioning federal preemption in areas of formerly state environmental law).
63
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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government has but it does not.64 These days, more often than not, the more difficult preemption question
is not whether the federal government could preempt, but whether (and to what degree) it should. 65
Ongoing dilemmas about scope and restraint in contexts of jurisdictional overlap demonstrate the
force with which federalism and preemption controversies remain alive and well in the United States.
They also indicate the considerable uncertainty faced by the people who actually govern in these contexts
of overlap in determining how, exactly, they should do their jobs. They face uncertainty about who
should “get to decide” when a federalism-charged decision must be made, and how to otherwise share or
divide regulatory authority in the performance of their obligations. Yet even as academics struggle to
make sense of what the Court and Constitution say about who should decide, those who actually govern
in areas of overlap do not usually struggle with academic questions. More often than not, they face down
the federalism uncertainty that they confront in their work simply by negotiating through it. Working
together with their counterparts on either side of the state-federal line, they jointly determine how best to
allocate contested authority as needed to cope with the problems entrusted to their care.66
Accordingly, much of my own research in recent years has been a voyage of discovery into just
how much federalism-sensitive governance is, in fact, the product of intergovernmental bargaining. It has
been instructive—even surprising—to discover just how often the answer to the question “who gets to
decide?” is reached through some process of negotiation, through a variety of constitutional and statutory
frameworks that enable these negotiations to take place. Federalism bargaining includes examples of
conventional political haggling, formalized methods of collaborative policymaking, and even more
remote signaling processes by which state and federal actors share responsibility for public decision
making over time.67 In the following section, I sketch out some basic ways that state and federal actors
negotiate with one another in federalism-sensitive contexts. But first, this section highlights two
important normative consequences of this research into negotiated governance.
The first engages the growing gap between the rhetorical emphasis of the mainstream federalism
discourse and the reality of intergovernmental relations in the United States. The sheer volume of
negotiated governance demonstrated in the full taxonomy suggests a story far different from the
presumption of state-federal antagonism that colors so many academic discussions about American
federalism.68 Indeed, it belies a pervasive mythology that arguably hangs over much of the discourse,
which we might call “the Myth of Zero-Sum Federalism.”69 This is the idea that the state and federal
governments are locked in a bitter, winner-takes-all competition for jurisdiction, in which every victory
by one side constitutes a loss for the other. There are certainly instances in which this is true, as the
Department of Justice’s lawsuit over Arizona immigration law will likely demonstrate.70 But as Part III
64

RYAN, supra note 1, Chapters Five and Eight (reviewing regulatory realms in which the federal government
invites state involvement even though it could legitimately preempt the field).
65
Id.; cf. William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 NYU
L Rev. 1547 (2007) (discussing the advantages of narrowly tailored “floor preemption”, which enables state
discretion to exceed a federal standard, over the alternative “unitary federal choice” or “ceiling preemption,” which
does not); Ann Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009) (discussing the
advantages of declining to fully preempt state discretion within a national program of air pollution prevention).
66
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapters Eight and Nine (reviewing the varieties and mechanics of such bargaining).
67
Id. at Chapter Eight.
68
Id. at Chapter Eight (presenting the taxonomy) and Part IV Introduction (discussing its significance).
69
Id. at Part IV Introduction.
70
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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of this essay reveals, the line between state and federal power is just as often an ongoing project of
negotiation, at levels large and small, and often in ways that often accrue to the advantage of both sides.
This simple observation warrants emphasis, because it makes a powerful point about what American
federalism actually looks like in practice, and about how federalism in practice often departs from
federalism in rhetoric.71
The second normative point addresses the significance of the interpretive potential of federalism
bargaining, the subject to which Part IV of this essay is devoted. There I argue that this robust recourse to
intergovernmental bargaining is not just a de facto response to interpretive uncertainty on the part of the
Court or Congress about exactly who should get to decide in each instance. Instead, I show that—at least
when it’s done well—such bargaining can itself be a constitutionally legitimate way of deciding. That is
to say, it can itself be a legitimate way of interpreting federalism—when we understand federalism
interpretation as how we effectively constrain public administration to be consistent with the governing
constitutional directives.72 As Part IV explains, properly designed federalism bargaining can incorporate
not only the consent principles that legitimize bargaining in general, but also the fundamental federalism
values that should guide federalism interpretation in any forum—as a matter of good governance
procedure.73
But before advancing to that argument, I here emphasize the significance this second point bears
for an important normative problem of federalism theory, with which American jurists have wrestled for
ages. If the most basic inquiry of American federalism is “who gets to decide—the state or federal
government?”, then the necessary corollary—the meta-inquiry, if you will—is “who gets to decide that?”
Is it the Court, through judicially enforceable federalism constraints? Congress, through political
safeguards? The executive branch, through administrative process? Scholars of American federalism
will recognize this as the “Federalism Safeguards” debate with which theorists have been engaged over
hundreds of years, which seeks to identify which branch of government should hold final interpretive
authority over the allocation of state and federal regulatory authority in contexts of jurisdictional
overlap.74 Indeed, it is a debate spanning hundreds of years precisely because it is a hard one to resolve—
all three of these branches possess useful tools to bring to bear on the project.
However—and here is the critical point—the entire time we have been holding this debate, it has
been focused exclusively on how each of these branches acts to interpret federalism unilaterally—on one
side of the state-federal line or the other—alone in their chambers as they figure out whether to enact a
law in a context of overlap, whether to uphold it if challenged, and how to implement it if it survives
challenge. Yet this entire time, the debate has been missing how the three branches are also interpreting
federalism bilaterally—on both sides of the state-federal line—through the processes of
intergovernmental bargaining that are the focus of this essay.75
This insight into the bilateral nature of so much federalism-sensitive governance in the United
States powerfully alters the Safeguards debate about federalism interpretation. Understanding bilateral
interpretive tools offers new insight on the available means of federalism interpretation, providing new

71

RYAN, supra note 1, at Part IV Introduction.
Id. at Chapter Eight (defining federalism interpretation).
73
Id. at Chapter Ten (evaluating the procedural consistency of bargaining with fairness and federalism principles).
74
Id. at Chapter Eight (reviewing the competing positions within the federalism safeguards debate); supra notes 3435 and accompanying text.
75
Id. at Part IV.
72
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theoretical justification for existing practices that warrant deference and better means of evaluating
whether they do. It also raises new questions about how best to allocate interpretive roles among the
three branches and various levels of our system of government. To put flesh on the bones of these
provocative assertions, we now explore the federalism bargaining enterprise itself.
3

Negotiated Federalism: An Introduction to U.S. Intergovernmental Bargaining

This section explores the variety of mechanisms available to state and federal actors for
bargaining over federalism interpretation and implementation in the United States. My analysis of
negotiated governance adopts the broad definition of bargaining that negotiation theorists prefer: “an
iterative process of communication by which multiple parties seek to influence one another in a project of
joint decision making.”76 Framing negotiation as an iterative process of joint decision making
encompasses many examples that fit the conventional notion of negotiation—perhaps legislative lobbying
in the back of some smoke-filled room—where the bargaining is neatly bounded in time and space, the
parties are all easily identified, and participants see their objective as one of deal-making. But it also
includes examples beyond the conventional— such as the iterative policymaking negotiations and
intersystemic signaling examples—which may take place over a longer period of time, with a broader
array of participants, who may not even think of what they are doing at the time as negotiating.77
As aforementioned, my previous work presents a detailed taxonomy of ten basic kinds of
federalism bargaining, identifying different opportunities for state and federal actors to negotiate over the
allocation of policymaking and implementation authority in federalism-sensitive contexts.78 The
taxonomy groups them into three overarching categories: conventional examples, negotiations to
reallocate authority, and joint policymaking negotiations (although some examples fit within more than
one category).
The first category requires little explanation in an abbreviated discussion, because most readers
will already understand them at an intuitive level. Conventional negotiations are of the “smoke-filled
room” variety, reflecting the most ordinary ways in which state and federal actors negotiate with all the
hallmarks of traditional deal-making. They involve a simple exchange of value or a purposeful collective
deliberation between well-identified participants, with a clear beginning and end. Conventional
federalism bargaining is common in administrative proceedings, in settlement of litigation or other
specific disputes, and over enforcement matters in which both state and federal actors have an interest.
State and municipal agencies also engage in conventional negotiations with federal legislators over
matters of joint concern through the interest-group representation model of lawmaking that characterizes
our representative democracy.79

76

Id. See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM L. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
xvii, 100 (1991) (describing it as “back-and-forth communication designed to reach agreement” whenever parties
have both shared and differing interests); RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION
STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 6 (1999) (describing it as the “interactive communication process” that takes
place when parties want things from each other).
77
See supra text accompanying note 42; RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing these examples in detail).
78
Id.; see also Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 41 (providing a more detailed taxonomy in comparison to
the edited version that appears in FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN).
79
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (reviewing conventional negotiations).
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These most familiar examples of federalism bargaining are also most frequently used, variously
addressing matters of policymaking, implementation, and enforcement. The results usually become part
of the public record, but the process itself may be largely hidden from view (a consequence of the smokefilled room), such that details are only available through first-hand accounts. For this reason, even though
conventional examples seem most comfortably familiar, they are also the most vulnerable to conventional
negotiating concerns about transparency, inclusion, third-party impacts, and principal-agent tensions.80
When manifest, and as reviewed in Part IV, such procedural issues may compromise the federalism
interpretive potential of such bargaining, even if it does not complicate the legitimacy of the result for
other purposes.81
The second category, state-federal negotiations to reallocate authority (or depart from an
otherwise established legal order) includes slightly more interesting examples. These take place when
there actually is some constitutional or statutory line in the jurisdictional sand that purports to answer the
question of “who gets to decide?”—but the parties then negotiate around that line. The best known
examples are those that take place under the Spending Clause of the Constitution,82 which enables the
federal government to bargain with the states for access to policymaking areas initially reserved by the
Constitution to the states, such as education or public health policy. In an example specifically upheld as
constitutional by the Supreme Court, Congress persuaded the states to adopt a minimum legal drinking
age of 21 years in exchange for federal highway funding (on the theory that raising the legal drinking age
would reduce deaths on federally-maintained highways from drunken driving).83 Spending power
bargains are frequently the basis for statutory programs of cooperative federalism, in which the state and
federal governments take responsibility for separate parts of interlinking regulatory programs, such as the
national highway system mentioned above, the Coastal Zone Management program discussed below, or
social safety net programs like Medicaid.84
Spending power bargaining enables federal access to policymaking realms reserved to the states,
but federalism bargaining to reallocate authority can work in the other direction as well. The states
sometimes negotiate directly with Congress to encroach on policymaking arenas specifically delegated by
the Constitution to the federal government.85 This kind of federalism bargaining takes place whenever the
states seek (constitutionally mandated) congressional approval for interstate compacts that augment state
authority at the expense of federal authority.86 States often do so when negotiating interstate compacts
that would otherwise encroach on the federal commerce power.87 For example, the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Compact was negotiated between 2001 and 2005 when eight regional states feared
that federal proposals to divert lake waters to the high plains might lead to federally mandated water
transfers to arid western states.88 The compact makes it difficult for later federal choices to divert water
80

Id.
In other words, a smoke-filled room bargain that leads to the enactment of legislation may yield perfectly
legitimate legislation, but the bargaining process used to create that legislation may or may not confer the kind of
interpretive legitimacy described in Part IV that would require deference from a reviewing court.
82
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
83
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
84
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (reviewing Medicaid demonstration waivers).
85
Id. (discussing bargained-for encroachment).
86
E.g., id. at Chapter Seven (discussing compacts limiting interstate shipments of low-level radioactive waste).
87
Id. at Chapter Eight (discussing interstate water allocation compacts).
88
DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 10:24 (2009).
81
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from the Great Lakes basin,89 empowering state decision-making at the expense of federal prerogative
despite clear federal supremacy in the allocation of interstate waters.90
Nevertheless, this essay focuses attention on the third and most intriguing category of federalism
bargaining, the joint policymaking negotiations, which draw on elements of the prior two. These take
place in those zones of jurisdictional overlap in which the federal government could fully preempt state
involvement under one of its enumerated powers—but it declines to do so, usually in light of some
critical substantive expertise, legal authority, or boots-on-the-ground enforcement capacity that local
government possesses but national government does not.91 Negotiated federal rulemaking with state
stakeholders provides one example, in which state actors assist federal agencies in drafting regulations
ranging from environmental to national security issues.92 Federal statutes that explicitly share policy
design with participating states provide another, such as the Coastal Zone Management Act discussed
below.93 Joint policymaking also takes place through less formalized iterative processes that stagger state
and federal leadership over time, such as the Clean Air Act example that follows.94 Subtle policy
negotiations are even conducted informally through the remote device of intersystemic signaling, by
which independently operating state and federal actors trade influence over the direction of evolving
interjurisdictional policy, such as the ongoing developments in state and national policy over medical
marijuana.95
In contrast to conventional bargaining where only the results are made public, the process of joint
policymaking negotiations is often as available for scrutiny as its results, moderating concerns about
negotiated governance that hinge on transparency (and bolstering eligibility for interpretive potential
under the Part IV test). Moreover, joint policymaking bargaining is usually the result of legislative
design, offering opportunities to engineer support for federalism considerations into the negotiating
process even when participants may be distracted by more immediate substantive goals.96 The following
discussion analyzes two examples of joint policymaking federalism bargaining to demonstrate two
different models of negotiated governance in federalism-sensitive contexts. The first takes the U.S.
Coastal Zone Management Act as an example of a “policymaking laboratory” negotiation, and the second
draws on the U.S. Clean Air Act’s mechanism for regulating automobile emissions to demonstrate the
contrasting model of “iterative federalism bargaining.”
3.1

Policymaking Laboratory Negotiations: The Coastal Zone Management Act

The “policymaking laboratory negotiations” are an especially fruitful variety of joint
policymaking bargaining that harness the promise of federalism as a national laboratory of state-based

89

Id. at § 10-32.
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54, 959-60 (1982).
91
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing joint policymaking bargaining).
92
Id. (reviewing negotiated rulemaking, including examples regulating stormwater and state identification cards).
93
Pub. L. No. 92–583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006)).
94
42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(1).
95
See RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing the example of medical marijuana policy).
96
Id.
90
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ideas and experimentation.97 In these negotiations, the federal government invites the states to propose
innovations and variations within existing federal laws that address realms of concurrent jurisdiction.
Some federal statutes invite states to experiment with local improvements on the general federal approach
by proposing specific waivers or exceptions, as do Medicaid and other Social Security Act programs.98
Congress also authorizes bargaining in statutes that invite states to lead through local policymaking in
support of national objectives, or to design implementation plans in support of federal standards. Federal
agencies occasionally use similar processes in articulating rules to implement congressional statutes, as
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did in developing stormwater regulations under the
Clean Water Act.99 Policymaking laboratory negotiations often (though not always) take place in the
context of a spending power-based program of cooperative federalism.
The Coastal Zone Management Act100 (CZMA) presents a model in which the federal government
frames the overall goals of regulatory policy and invites the states to take the lead in proposing how best
to attain them locally, based on their own unique economic, environmental, or demographic factors. The
CZMA creates a complex forum for ongoing intergovernmental bargaining, designed to protect coastal
resources from the cumulative impacts of development pressures on a scale beyond that addressed by
traditional local land use planning.101
The CZMA addresses a classic problem of overlap, one hopelessly mired in the gray area of
concurrent state and federal regulatory interest.102 The clearest interjurisdictional factor lies seaward of
the coast, given water’s notorious unwillingness to abide by political boundaries. No matter how hard a
coastal community works to protect the resources on the wet side of its shoreline, it will find little success
without the cooperation of its neighbors. Coastal waters flow across state lines, resources suspended in
that water will do the same, and pollutants threatening the quality of all of these resources will also freely
migrate across these boundaries. Fisheries, water quality, and other straddling coastal resources simply
cannot be managed purely at the local level; the boundary crossing nature of the resource requires a more
coordinated approach.
However, neither can the federal government effectively manage these resources on its own. As
marine scientists have long warned, among the greatest threats to these shared resources is marine
pollution originating from land-based activities regulated at the state and local level. Even traditional
land use planning decisions that affect industrial development patterns, suburban sprawl, and private
transportation choices can effect marine pollution levels, by encouraging or discouraging the conveyance
to coastal waters of manufacturing pollutants, lawn pesticides and fertilizers, and vehicular residues.

97

Id. (discussing policymaking laboratory negotiations). See also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); supra note 29 and accompanying text.
98
See RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing Social Security Act waiver programs).
99
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4) (2000) (authorizing stormwater regulation); EPA OFFICE OF WATER, OVERVIEW OF THE
STORM WATER PROGRAM 8 (1996), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0195.pdf. See also RYAN, supra note 1, at
Chapters Five and Eight (discussing the “Phase II” stormwater rule developed through negotiated rulemaking).
100
Pub. L. No. 92–583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006)).
101
Id. at § 1451(i) (2006); 136 Cong. Rec. 26030, 26030–67 (1990) (statement of Rep. Walter B. Jones); S. Rep. No.
92–753 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4776, 4778.
102
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing the Coastal Zone Management Act in detail).
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Recognizing the need for an intergovernmental partnership on this and other grounds, Congress engaged
the states in an elaborate, three-tiered program of intergovernmental bargaining through the CZMA.103
In the first stage of negotiations, Congress initiates bargaining under its spending power, offering
financial and technical assistance for voluntary state management programs to protect resources in coastal
waters, submerged lands, and adjacent shorelands.104 Unlike other laws that promise federal control if
states choose not to participate, the CZMA establishes no mandatory compliance standards and does not
authorize federal implementation for states that opt out.105 Nevertheless, the states have responded
enthusiastically, with formal participation by all thirty-five eligible coastal and Great Lakes states, as well
as extensive participation from municipal governments.106
In the second stage of bargaining, the relevant state and federal agencies haggle over the terms of
a state’s proposed plan, dickering over provisions that one side or the other would most prefer to see in
the final plan. In this conventional bargaining forum, the federal government appears to have the most
negotiating leverage, given that it maintains final approval authority and holds the ultimate carrot of
federal funding. However, all bargaining is driven by circumstances in which both sides need something
from the other. In this case, only the state possesses the local land use planning authority and governance
capacity needed to create and implement these management plans. In this regard, and as is true in so
many fields of spending power bargaining, federal fiscal leverage is matched by the leverage of state
governance capacity.107
In the final and most fascinating stage of the bargaining, the apparent leverage shifts. Once the
federal government approves the state plan, it effectively agrees itself to be bound by the state plan going
forward, or to ensure that all federal activities directly or indirectly affecting the coastal zone will be
consistent with the approved state plan.108 Under a limited waiver of federal supremacy known as the
CZMA “consistency provision,” federal actors must seek state permission for any actions that could
impact protected coastal resources. States may review not only those activities conducted by or on behalf
of a federal agency, but also activities that require a federal license or permit, activities conducted
pursuant to an Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act exploration plan, and any federally-funded activities
that may impact the coastal zone.109 States may disapprove activities that “affect any land or water use or

103

Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1453(1).
105
Summary of Coastal Zone Management Act and Amendments, EPA,
http://epa.gov/oecaagct/lzma.html#Summary%20of%20Coastal%20Zone%20Management%20Act%20and%20Ame
ndments.
106
Office of Ocean & Coastal Res. Mgmt., Coastal Zone Management Act Performance System 2 (2006),
http://coastalmanagement.noaa.gov/resources/docs/npmsupdate.pdf.; Jeffrey H. Wood, Protecting Native Coastal
Ecosystems: CZMA and Alaska’s Coastal Plan, 19 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 57 (2004) (discussing local
participation).
107
For a detailed discussion of the leverage dynamics within federalism bargaining, see RYAN, supra note 1, at
Chapter Nine.
108
Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Consistency Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 787 (Jan. 5, 2006) (codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 930).
109
16 U.S.C. § 1456(c); NOAA, Basic Statutory Tenets of Federal consistency, 71 Fed. Reg. 789-90.
104
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natural resource of the coastal zone” unless they are “consistent to the maximum extent practicable” with
accepted state management programs.110
In this way, the Act creates a rare instance in which the federal government must negotiate for
state permission before taking action, opening the door for ongoing communication, exchange, and
innovation over regulatory decision-making affecting the protected resources. The Act also provides a
mandatory but flexible mechanism for resolving potential conflicts between state and federal priorities,
fostering early consultation and negotiated coordination.111 The three stages of CZMA bargaining thus
effectively engage state and federal actors in an ongoing, ad infinitum dialogue about coastal
management, informed by both local and national insight in exactly the way that federalism intends.
In extraordinary circumstances, and only if the proposed federal action is “in the paramount
interest of the United States,” the Act enables the President to override state disapproval after
administrative and judicial mediation have failed to produce consensus.112 However, the vast majority of
federal consistency determinations are negotiated and administered without controversy.113 The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports that, “[w]hile States have negotiated changes to
thousands of federal actions over the years, States have concurred with approximately 93%-95% of all
federal actions reviewed.”114 The presidential exemption is exceedingly rare, and may have been used
only once, to authorize the military use of sonar in training exercises.115
The CZMA enables broadly negotiated local initiative within a framework of federal law that
ensures fidelity to both local and national concerns. It provides a useful model for interjurisdictional
governance matching broad national goals with policies best implemented at the local level, especially
where local land use authority or “place” is a necessarily salient feature of the regulatory problem.
3.2

Iterative Federalism Bargaining: The Clean Air Act

The Clean Air Act incorporates a very different example of federalism bargaining, one that
provides a good model for governance when an especially salient feature of the regulatory problem is its

110

16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1)(A). A federal agency may override objection only if it demonstrates that its activity is
consistent with the approved plan to the maximum extent practicable. CZMA §307(c)(1)-(2).
111
CZMA section 307 (16 U.S.C. §1456(h)(2)). See also Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Coastal
Zone Management Act, http://www.dep.state.fl.us/secretary/oip/czma.htm.
112
CZMA §307 (16 U.S.C. §1456(c)(1)(B), §1456 (h)(2)); California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.
2002).
113
136 Cong. Rec. H8068-01, 8072 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Jones).
114
NOAA, Department of Commerce, Coastal Zone Management Act Federal Consistency Regulations, 71 Fed.
Reg. 787, 789 (Jan. 5, 2006) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 930). See also RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (noting
that such high levels of consensus “[may] reflect the federal ability to override state protest through the presidential
exemption, which could reduce a state’s incentive to expend resources fighting a battle it expects to lose. However,
given that the presidential trump has been used so sparingly… a more likely explanation is that the consistency
process itself moderates what federal agencies seek. Understanding that federal action will require state approval
may promote greater federal deference to state interests in the very spirit intended by the Act. After all, the process
that must be navigated after a state objects is costly to resource-poor federal agencies as well.”).
115
See Joseph Romero, Uncharted Waters: The Expansion of State Regulatory Authority over Federal Activities and
Migratory Resources Under the Coastal Zone Management Act, 56 NAVAL L. REV. 137, 146 (2008).
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relationship to a national market. It showcases “iterative federalism bargaining,”116 in which the federal
and state governments share policymaking influence in precise, discrete steps over time. It also provides
a good example of the kind of intergovernmental bargaining that may not at first even register as
negotiation. In contrast to the formality of policymaking laboratory federalism, iterative federalism
bargaining happens so slowly that one might fail to notice the joint decision-making process unfolding
within its structure. In this scenario, the federal government creates a uniform national regulation while
allowing a single state to improve upon it—and then allows other states to select their preferred
alternative over time. By enabling ongoing choice between the federal standard and a single-state
alternative, iterative federalism programs create a limited dynamic of regulatory innovation and
competition by which state choices pressure federal standards.
For example, the Clean Air Act (CAA) governs the emission of air pollutants, including those by
automobiles and other mobile sources.117 Congress delegated the primary task of setting national
emissions standards to the EPA, saving the automobile industry from the crippling multiplicity of
manufacturing standards it feared if states could regulate independently. Nevertheless, it allowed the
state of California to set a competing state-wide standard that could be more (but not less) stringent than
EPA’s.118 The “California” exception was created initially out of respect for California’s leadership in the
field, and also because air quality in parts of the state so exceeded national averages that more stringent
motor vehicle regulations were necessary to meet other CAA obligations.119
Then, in a stroke of great legislative wisdom, Congress later enabled other states to choose
between following either the EPA or California standards.120 This critical structural modification created
a powerful forum for policymaking negotiation over the national direction of air quality management,
through an iterated process of subtle but joint state-federal decision-making. Over time, more and more
states initially following the EPA standards have migrated to the California alternative. As of 2009,
fourteen states were following California’s more stringent standards121 and a dozen more were exploring
the possibility.122 The force of state preferences has put upward pressure on EPA standards to match the
alternative, even as California’s standard continues to evolve.123 The overall effect, as states vote with

116

Carlson, supra note 65, at 1099 (2009) (coining the term to describe “repeated, sustained, and dynamic
lawmaking efforts involving both levels of government”).
117
42 U.S.C. § 7543.
118
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (so authorizing all states with an emissions program before 1966—i.e., California).
119
DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR HANDBOOK § 5:11 (2009).
120
42 U.S.C. § 7507; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON STATE PRACTICES IN SETTING MOBILE
SOURCE EMISSIONS STANDARDS, STATE AND FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR MOBILE-SOURCE EMISSIONS 70-71 (2006)
(explaining that states Congress did so in response to state requests for more tools to meet ambient air standards).
121
JAMES MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CRS REPORT: CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER REQUEST UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
ACT TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 4, n. 13 (2009),
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/09Mar/RL34099.pdf.
122
Emily Chen, State Adoption Status on California Vehicle Emissions Control Requirements, Feb. 2008,
http://www.westar.org/Docs/Business%20Meetings/Spring08/ParkCity/03.2.2%20CAA%20177%20states.xls
(listing states considering adoption of California standards).
123
David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating Environmental
Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1840 (2008) (explaining the dissemination of CA standards over time
as other states, EPA, and automakers gradually adopt them).

18

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2079860

Erin Ryan

The Once and Future Challenges of American Federalism

1/12/2012

their regulatory feet, is that the nation’s vehicular emissions standards are in a constant state of evolution
toward more ambitious, targeted, and rational goals.
The power of iterative policymaking is in the way that it uniquely balances the needs for
federalism innovation and economic uniformity in a national marketplace.124 In the case of the CAA,
automobile manufacturers may prefer a single set of emissions standards, but coping with two is certainly
preferable to fifty moving targets. Similarly, states may ideally prefer to set their own standards, but a
choice between at least two levels of stringency is preferable to no choice at all. Meanwhile, the managed
exchange enables a limited level of regulatory innovation and competition, creating regulatory dynamism
that is more responsive to new data and preferences—and less vulnerable to regulatory capture—than a
pure regulatory monopoly.125 In effect, it offers a precisely constrained, miniature laboratory of ideas.
Iterative federalism strikes a wise compromise in regulatory marketplaces where legitimate
concerns over stagnating regulatory monopoly compete with legitimate economic needs for regulatory
uniformity. The approach serves governance hinging on a centralized national market while preserving
space for regulatory innovation. The iterative policymaking structure also protects state innovators that
invest in efforts to resolve their share of an interjurisdictional problem before the rest follow—as
California did in regulating automobile emissions, and as several are now doing in attempting to regulate
other greenhouse gas production.126 State innovators would suffer disproportionately if forced to abandon
path-breaking regulatory infrastructure to conform to a preemptive federal standard.127 For these reasons,
some scholars have proposed that the CAA’s model of iterative federalism policymaking may be a useful
means of navigating federalism concerns in U.S. climate policymaking.128 Given the implied collective
action problem at hand129 and the role many states have already played in early rounds of climate
policymaking negotiations,130 the suggestion may have merit.
4

The Interpretive Potential of Federalism Bargaining

Drawing from the examples of federalism bargaining in the previous section and the full
taxonomy, this final part of the essay demonstrates how some of this bargaining represents more than just
a de facto response to federalism uncertainty (although, to be sure, some of clearly represents that as
well). But in addition, some such intergovernmental bargaining can itself yield constitutionally legitimate
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RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (discussing iterative federalism bargaining in detail).
Id.; cf. Buzbee, supra note 65, (showing how unitary federal choice (“ceiling”) preemption leads to poorly
tailored regulation and public choice distortions of the political process in comparison to “floor” preemption).
126
See Michele M. Betsill & Barry G. Rabe, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance: The Evolving State and
Local Roles, in Toward Sustainable Communities: Transitions and Transformations in Environmental Policy 201–26
(Daniel A. Mazmanian & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2nd ed. 2009); see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational
Climate Change Initiatives in the Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 Publius 432 (2009) (reviewing existing
state and regional initiatives).
127
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Eight (further discussing the problematic effects of a preemptive national policy,
the threat of which would disincentivize states from early action that could most efficiently address the problem).
128
Carlson, supra note 65, at 1099.
129
E.g., Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 579, 579–80 (2008)
(proposing a collective action framework to determine when state law should be federally preempted).
130
See supra note 126.
125
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answers to federalism’s core questions—helping to bridge federalism’s once and future challenges. It
explores how the procedural incorporation of fair bargaining and federalism principles into state-federal
bargaining contributes to the overall federalism interpretive project. The analysis establishes a sound
theoretical basis for the ways that bilaterally negotiated partnerships legitimately supplement the
unilateral efforts of the Court, Congress, and the Executive to protect constitutional values in the structure
of American governance.131
To clarify the terms of the discussion, I use the word “substantive” to refer to the substance of a
legal rule or negotiated outcome, and “procedural” to refer to the process by which that rule or outcome
was reached. Although the federalism discourse sometimes uses the term “unilateral” to distinguish the
independent acts of separate branches of government (for example, unilateral judicial or legislative
action), I use it here to distinguish the independent acts of one level of government from another (in other
words, exclusively state or federal activity). By contrast, “bilateral” refers to governance that
incorporates both state and federal decision-making.132 Finally, in discussing “federalism interpretation,”
I emphasize the variety of means we employ to ensure that governmental practice is conducted in accord
with the relevant constitutional directives. In addition to conventionally understood methods of unilateral
interpretation, such as legislative statement and judicial review, this Part shows that certain bilateral
bargaining does similar work, especially within the gaps of legal indeterminacy in which unilateral
methods often underperform.133
To summarize my ultimate proposition, it is that the more bilateral intergovernmental bargaining
incorporates legitimizing procedures founded on mutual consent and federalism values, the more it
warrants deference as a means of interpreting federalism.134 Bargaining confers less interpretive
legitimacy as the factual circumstances depart from the assumptions of mutual consent that underlie fair
bargaining—in other words, when negotiators cannot freely opt out, cannot be trusted to understand their
own interests, or cannot be trusted to faithfully represent their principals—and when the bargaining
procedures contravene the good governance ethics of checks, accountability, autonomy, and synergy that
underlie federalism. Courts adjudicating federalism-based challenges to negotiated results should
consider these factors when deciding the appropriate level of deference to extend. Political branches
engaged in federalism bargaining should consider how to better engineer procedural regard for these
values into their various processes of public administration.
The remainder takes a cursory stab at unpacking this provocative claim about the interpretive
potential of federalism bargaining. The claim is that intergovernmental bargaining can be a
constitutionally legitimate way of resolving federalism uncertainty, when it is procedurally consistent
131

For a fuller presentation of this analysis, see RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten.
See supra note 43, noting how this discussion treats municipal activity as state action, consistent with the
Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. But see RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Two (“For the sake of
simplification, my discussion frequently lumps municipal, state, and regional governance (everything more localized
than the national government) together under the heading of ‘local,’ to best contrast the federal and state-based
authority that most federalism doctrine differentiates. However, important scholarship has shown the significance of
intra- and interjurisdictional governance that takes place between localities independently of their states (and
occasionally their nation-states) and between municipal and federal collaborators—exposing not only the horizontal
but the diagonal dimensions of interjurisdictional governance.”) (citations omitted).
133
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter One (discussing indeterminacy in constitutional federalism directives) and
Chapter Ten (discussing circumstances in which bilateral interpretation outperforms unilateral interpretation).
134
Id. at Chapter Ten.
132
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with two sets of principles. The first set tests the fundamental fairness of the bargaining process, and the
second tests the consistency of that bargaining process with federalism values.
4.1

The Bargaining Principles of Mutual Consent

The first requirement for interpretive-quality federalism bargaining is that it must be consistent
with the generic principles of mutual consent that serve to legitimize bargaining in general. These are the
fairness-based principles that make us willing to defer to the results of negotiated agreement, as human
cultures have done for the thousands of years over which we have relied on bargaining as a rational means
of pursuing the good in the absence of consensus about the perfect.135 We do this, in fact, by substituting
procedural consensus for substantive consensus—consensus about the process for reaching an agreedupon outcome, even when we can’t agree on a substantive rationale for why this outcome is the
objectively correct result. Although admittedly unsexy when rendered in its component parts, the
mechanism for legitimizing a negotiated agreement basically goes something like this:
Consider a group that begins in disagreement over how to resolve a dispute, allocate a scarce
resource, or otherwise divide a given surplus of value. At the outset, they lack consensus about an
objectively correct substantive outcome; they have no reasoned basis for dividing that surplus of value
according to shared principles. But if, after some meaningful process of communication, these competing
parties nevertheless reach agreement on some specific outcome—because each has determined that it this
specific outcome is better for their own individual interests than no agreed-upon outcome at all—then,
um, well—then that outcome must be, in at least some respect, a good idea. (!) It deserves some degree
of deference beyond what we might accord a random-chance distribution.
This reasoning may seem too raw to carry the weight of legitimacy that we hang on bargained-for
results, but it really does come down to this exceedingly simple lived wisdom. If, through a fair process
of exchange, each determines that they are really better off with this result than no deal, then that result
must have some inherent merit. So long as we believe the agreement was fairly procured, it warrants
respect beyond one obtained by force, guile, or chance—even if the parties have different reasons for why
they prefer this alternative. It is in this respect that we substitute procedural consensus for substantive
consensus.136 And the substitution works, so long as the three underlying assumptions of fair bargaining
are met: (1) exit-ensured autonomy, (2) interest literacy, and (3) faithful representation.137
First, it must be true that genuine exit is available to all negotiators, ensuring participant
autonomy.138 Each must be able to “walk away” from the bargaining table if they so choose, or else the
agreement cannot carry the weight of bargained-for legitimacy. If a party lacks a meaningful exit
alternative, then the result isn’t necessarily better for their interests than random chance or no agreement,
and accordingly warrants no such deference. An outcome procured in the absence of genuine autonomy
may reflect the result of force more than independent judgment. As contract law recognizes, an
agreement reached under true duress (and not just relative hardship) should not be enforceable.139

135

Id. (discussing the principles of mutual consent).
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Cf. 17A C.J.S. CONTRACTS § 176 (2010).
136
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Nevertheless, both contract law and negotiation theory hold parties responsible for their choices when
true exit is available, differentiating between strong leverage and actual coercion.140
Second, for the process to confer negotiated legitimacy, we have to believe that the parties possess
the requisite level of interest literacy.141 In other words, we must be assured that the parties each
understand their own interests well enough for their agreement to be a meaningful indicator of the merit
of the negotiated outcome—or, once again, there is no reason to presume its superiority to random chance
or no deal. Negotiators must not be operating under a contract-law disability (such as incompetency or
infancy) or other circumstance that might cast doubt on their independent judgment as to why this result
is really better than the alternatives.
Finally, we must be confident that the negotiating agents involved in the bargaining process are
faithfully representing their principles.142 In the case of intergovernmental bargaining, this means that the
government officials engaged in federalism bargaining must faithfully advance the interests of the citizens
they serve. Principal-agent concerns are endemic to all negotiation,143 and they may be especially fraught
in public negotiations of this sort.144 Evidence of self-dealing on the part of the government negotiators
would certainly negate their legitimacy.145
Probing the examples of federalism bargaining in my taxonomy yields examples that put pressure
on each of these assumptions. For example, some have argued that spending power bargains are coercive
of states that have grown dependent on federal funding, to the point that some have lost the element of
free will necessary to satisfy the bargaining autonomy criterion.146 Some have raised concerns about the
principle-agent tension in intergovernmental bargaining that may advance the career-interests of the
bargainers more than those of their constituents.147 Indeed, the more pressure the underlying facts in an
140

Id. (“[O]ne may not avoid a contract on the ground of duress merely because he or she entered into it with
reluctance, the contract is very disadvantageous to him or her, the bargaining power of the parties was unequal, or
there was some unfairness in the negotiations . . . .”). See also RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten (“Even when the
stronger party crafts terms without input from the weaker party, the latter can still decide whether its interests are
better served by taking or leaving the proffered deal.”).
141
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten.
142
Id.
143
See, e.g., ROBERT MNOOKIN, ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
DISPUTES 69 (2000) (describing the principal-agent tension in negotiations).
144
See, e.g., JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 287 (1987) (describing how elections
can distort incentives for representatives in government).
145
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Seven (discussing the principle-agent tension in state-federal bargaining over
jurisdictional entitlements), Chapter Nine (discussing the currency of “credit” in state-federal bargaining) and
Chapter Ten (discussing the problem of self-dealing in evaluating federalism bargaining legitimacy).
146
Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending
Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 499–500 (2003) (arguing
that spending power bargains are coercive for this reason); Mitchell N. Berman, Guillen and Gullibility: Piercing
the Surface of Commerce Clause Doctrine, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1487, 1523–26, 1531–32 (2004) (same). See also
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten (analyzing these claims and contrasting the examples of the CZMA with the No
Child Left Behind Act, which conditioned federal education funds on state adoption of various federal priorities).
147
John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a Federal
System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 90 (2004) (warning that states may collude with federal actors in undermining
federalism constraints). See also RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Seven (analyzing this claim and evaluating them in
the context of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act).
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instance of bargaining put on any one of these assumptions, the more doubt is generated about the
legitimacy of the bargained-for result.148 Inversely, however, the more the facts in a given example of
bargaining do line up with these assumptions, then the more legitimacy is conferred on the resulting
outcome. Many examples in the taxonomy proceed from solid ground on all three assumptions, and these
become the candidates for constitutionally meaningful interpretive potential.149
4.2

Procedural Faithfulness to Federalism Values

The principles of mutual consent that legitimize bargaining in general are the threshold
procedural criteria that must be met before advancing to the second stage. The final analysis tests the
criteria that render such bargaining not only fair, but constitutionally significant. And to some extent, the
analysis begins with a similar story.
Indeed, we can introduce the procedural application of federalism values in terms not unlike those
used to explain the principles of mutual consent. Just as individuals turn to negotiation as a legitimizing
procedure of allocation, so do state and federal actors to allocate jurisdiction in areas of overlap. And
very often, it is for the same basic reason—the lack of any up-front, substantive consensus about the
objectively correct result. As history is our witness, Americans seem to have a lot of trouble agreeing at
the outset about whether a given regulatory outcome in a context of jurisdictional overlap does or doesn’t
satisfy the requirements of constitutional federalism. Based on overwhelming evidence in the academic,
judicial, and political realms, we can see that it’s not always immediately clear how to interpret the
federalism contours of a substantive regulatory policy.150 (At the very least, what may seem immediately
clear to some interpreters proves anything but to others.)
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence for this proposition is the wealth of federalism decisions
that regularly split the U.S. Supreme Court, in which roughly half of the justices determine that the
challenged policy is perfectly consistent with federalism while the other half consider it a constitutional
violation. For example, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in New York v. United States,151 a
famous Tenth Amendment case holding that a Congressional statute forcing states to internalize their own
toxic waste had unconstitutionally commandeered state authority—even though the law had been drafted
by the states and the plaintiff had actively lobbied Congress to enact it.152 Writing for the majority,
Justice O’Connor solemnly reminded the nation that “[w]hatever the outer limits of [state] sovereignty
148

RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten.
Id. (discussing procedural faithfulness to federalism values in bargaining).
150
See, e.g., id. at Chapter One (discussing controversy over the Bush Administration’s response to Hurricane
Katrina, including invocations of federalism by some officials as grounds for the halting federal involvement),
Chapter Three (reviewing marked instability in the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence over American
history), and Chapter Four (reviewing academic controversy over the New Federalism revival of the 1990s).
151
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174-75 (1992) (invalidating on Tenth Amendment grounds a federal
law requiring states to site waste disposal facilities or assume liability for harm). Unlike many controversial 5-4
Supreme Court federalism decisions since then—including United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(overturning the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 for exceeding federal commerce authority); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating parts of the Brady Handgun Control Act of 1993 under the Tenth
Amendment for compelling state law enforcement); and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)
(invalidating portions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA) for exceeding Congress’s commerce
power)—New York was actually decided by a vote of six to three.
152
New York, 505 U.S. at 174-75, 180-83; RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Seven (analyzing the case in detail).
149
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may be, one thing is clear: The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program.”153 In near incredulous dissent, Justice White argued that “to read the Court’s
version of events… one would think that Congress was the sole proponent of a solution to the Nation’s
low-level radioactive waste problem [when the Act] resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a
state-based set of remedies to the waste problem. They sought not federal pre-emption or intervention,
but rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached.”154 In this fascinating
review of bargained-for encroachment, the two opinions diverge so dramatically that they almost appear
to be interpreting different fact patterns. When it comes to federalism interpretation, reasonable minds
can (and very frequently do) disagree—even the most highly skilled legal minds of the day.
Of course, part of the reason for so many divided-Court federalism decisions is that the individual
justices often apply different theories of federalism in reaching their diverging conclusions (indeed, this is
one of the core themes of my book). But another important factor, one that is too often missed, has to do
with the special difficulty of applying structural federalism directives in specific contexts of jurisdictional
overlap, at least in comparison to more straightforward individual rights analysis.155 In a nutshell, the
problem is that it can be very difficult to sort out just the federalism considerations that go into a
regulated outcome from all the other substantive considerations that must also go into that outcome—for
example, to separate out concerns about who should be making health care policy from the complicated
substantive elements of health care policy itself. By contrast, it’s much easier to figure out whether the
process by which the parties come to an agreement about substantive policy is consistent with
constitutional federalism. And the critically important reason for this, as foreshadowed earlier, is that the
foundational federalism values are themselves procedural in nature.156
Recall the federalism values that I introduced at the beginning of the essay: checks and balances,
transparency and accountability, local autonomy and innovation, interjurisdictional synergy. In fact, these
values don’t hold a lot of particularly substantive meaning. At the end of the day, they don’t really tell us
much about what the substantive content of good government policy should be. Instead, they hold much
more meaning as procedural values. They describe what the processes of good government look like—
governance that operates with checks and balances, in an accountable way, with space for local

153

505 U.S. at 188.
505 at 189-90 (J. White, dissenting) (citations omitted).
155
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten. As I explain there,
In contrast to adjudicating rights, a substantive realm in which the Constitution’s directions are relatively
clear, the adjudication of federalism draws on penumbral implications in the text that leave much more to
interpretation. The boundary between state and federal authority is implied by structural directives such as
the enumeration of federal powers in Article I and the retention of state power in the Tenth Amendment,
but neither commands the clarity of commitment that the Constitution makes to identifiable individual
rights. Setting aside marginal uncertainty about the extent that ‘no law’ really means no law in the First
Amendment context, the Constitution is comparatively clear in its substantive commitment to free speech
and free exercise. It is equally clear on the allocation of certain state and federal powers, such as which is
responsible for waging war (the federal government) and which is responsible for locating federal elections
(the states). But the document gives less guidance about the correct answers to the federalism questions
that become the subject of intergovernmental bargaining, such as how to balance local and national
interests in coastal zone management, or how to allocate state and federal resources in criminal law
enforcement. For these reasons, negotiated federalism is not only inevitable but appropriate, and arguably
constitutionally invited….
Id. (citations omitted).
156
Id. at Chapter Ten.
154
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innovation and interjurisdictional synergy.157 Indeed, each of the fundamental federalism values are most
directly vindicated through good governance procedure: (1) the maintenance of checks and balances that
procedurally protects individuals against government excess or abdication, (2) the protection of
governmental accountability that procedurally ensures meaningful democratic participation, (3) the
preference for regulatory processes that foster local innovation and competition, and (4) the procedural
cultivation of regulatory space in which to harness the synergy between local and national governance
capacity.158 Incorporating these values into the bargaining process procedurally allows negotiators to
advance federalism directives when consensus on the substance is unavailable—filling the inevitable
interpretive gaps left by judicial and legislative mandates that lead to so much substantive controversy.159
Accordingly, if we review the process for reaching some negotiated outcome among state and
federal actors and we discover that, in fact, it is consistent with these values—it protects rights, enables
meaningful democratic participation, and allows for innovation, competition, and synergy—then we can
conclude that the given instance of federalism bargaining is consistent with constitutional federalism, and
its results warrant interpretive deference. The process itself becomes the center of gravity for
constitutional analysis. After all, facilitating the active operation of these values in governance is what
American federalism is most essentially for. Ensuring governance that is consistent with these values is
what federalism is meant to accomplish in the first place, and what federalism interpretation of any kind is
designed to advance. In this regard, engineering governance processes to operate this way gets us to the
same point as any other form of federalism interpretation, such as the more conventionally understood
unilateral forms of congressional lawmaking, executive rulemaking, or judicial adjudication. 160

157

Id.
Id. at Chapter Two (discussing the values in detail) and Chapter Ten (discussing them as procedural values).
159
Id. at Chapter Ten.
160
Id. Of note, this evaluation of bargaining procedure operates from the ex ante perspective, proposing procedural
judicial review and the purposeful engineering of interpretive-quality bargaining forums. Bolstering my claim,
however, is a skillful empirical literature that goes further to correlate negotiated governance processes and
outcomes in terms closely aligned with the foundational federalism values. As I describe in the book,
[W]hen the bargaining process is designed to safeguard rights, participation, innovation, and synergy, the
proposal assumes that federalism bargaining will harmonize with federalism as a procedural matter without
reference to the substantive results. Of note, however, bargained-for results that advance federalism values
at the more challenging substantive level are further evidence of good federalism process. To this end, the
negotiation literature offers encouraging empirical evidence that correlates the use of similar procedural
tools with outcomes that are highly consistent with federalism values. For example, Professor Lawrence
Susskind has empirically evaluated volumes of governance outcomes against criteria of fairness, efficiency,
stability, and wisdom, and found that negotiated governance consistently outperforms alternatives. He
convincingly argues that these criteria closely align with federalism values, noting that the problem-solving
qualities of negotiation naturally advance localism and synergy values, while representation is the key to
successful accountability and transparency.
Id. For a sampling of this literature, see LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE:
CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 14 (1987) (discussing this in detail); Kirk Emerson et
al., Environmental Conflict Resolution: Evaluating Performance Outcomes and Contributing Factors, 27 CONFLICT
RESOL. Q. 27 (2009) (analyzing the outcomes of 60 mediated agreements between local, state, and federal
governments); LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & OLE AMUNDSON, USING ASSISTED NEGOTIATION TO SETTLE LAND USE
DISPUTES: A GUIDEBOOK FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS (1999) (analyzing the results in 105 cases); Jody Freeman & Laura
I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60, 60–64 (2000) (reporting
on empirical data in studies of collaborative governance).
158
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Moreover, federalism bargaining has the added advantage of accomplishing these ends
bilaterally, providing structural support for the local-national equipoise that federalism strives for, in a
way that goes beyond what unilateral interpretive mechanisms can offer. Federalism bargaining that
meets the requisite criteria necessarily incorporates both local and national interests, perspectives, and
wisdom in the very manner that federalism intends—and regardless of the subjective considerations of the
bargainers. By virtue of its bilateral operation, qualifying state-federal bargaining accomplishes
federalism’s goals of state-federal equipoise even if the participants never once think about federalism
while they are bargaining. Federalism bargaining that meets the procedural criteria therefore provides
structural safeguards exceeding the considerations of the previous federalism safeguards debate.161
By this analysis, when reviewing federalism-based challenges to such bargaining, the judicial role
should shift from de novo review to deferential oversight for these criteria. If an instance of federalism
bargaining is challenged under any of the judicially-enforceable federalism doctrines, the court should
engage this procedural analysis as a threshold matter before reviewing the substantive results of the
bargaining. If bargaining took place in a legitimate zone of jurisdictional overlap and the procedural
criteria of fair bargaining and federalism values are met, then the court should defer to the substantive
results of that bargaining process.162 Chances are good that the substantive outcome involves an intricate
balance among the many considerations of interjurisdictional governance in which political actors
generally outperform judicial actors—one reason why courts have so often deferred to such results.
Nevertheless, were we to review the process and discover that it fails the second set of criteria—if
the bargaining process threatens rights, hampers participation, dampens innovation, or subverts
interjurisdictional synergy—then this bargaining would not be consistent with federalism values, and its
results would warrant no deference as a matter of constitutional interpretation. As foreshadowed earlier,
“smoke-filled room” bargaining that takes place beyond the realm of public accountability might be
vulnerable in this analysis, as would bargaining with poor procedural commitment to the other values.163
If such bargaining were judicially challenged on federalism grounds, the court should review it de novo
without deference to the choices of the political actors involved. And of course, when a court reviews
even a qualifying instance of federalism bargaining that is challenged on grounds unrelated to
federalism—perhaps for violating the terms of the underlying statute or some other constitutional
guarantee—then it should also proceed without deference to the negotiated outcome.164
161

RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten (“[E]ven unilateral governance that procedurally honors the federalism
values may warrant some lesser degree of judicial deference when challenged on federalism grounds. Still, although
unilateral policymaking may herald interpretive potential in proportion to its satisfaction of similar criteria,
negotiated governance provides structural support to federalism values that unilateral regulation can never truly
replicate.”)
162
Id. at Chapter Six (setting forth a gatekeeping inquiry to test legitimate assertions of jurisdictional overlap) and
Chapter Ten (exploring the application of these procedural criteria in judicial review).
163
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (differentiating between legitimate results and legitimizing procedure).
164
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten. As I explain there, judicial review of bargaining should unlimited in three
circumstances:
First, if the challenged intergovernmental bargaining takes place beyond the defensible realm of
jurisdictional overlap, it receives no interpretive deference. Second, if the challenged bargaining fails the
court’s threshold procedural review, then the court reviews the substance of the outcome de novo, applying
its own interpretive judgment on the federalism-related challenge. Third, non-federalism related challenges
to the products of valid interpretive federalism-bargaining warrant ordinary judicial scrutiny—limiting
judicial deference only to federalism challenges, and not other claims of constitutional or statutory
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The foregoing analysis accomplishes two normative objectives. First, it proposes a material
change in the mechanics of judicial review of federalism-based challenges to intergovernmental
bargaining. When the results of qualifying bargaining are challenged under judicially enforceable
federalism doctrines, courts should apply procedural scrutiny before substantive review, reflecting the
deferential standards used in judicial review of administrative action under the Administrative Procedures
Act165 and agency statutory interpretation under Chevron v. NRDC.166 If the court determines that the
bargaining process meets both sets of requisite criteria, then it should defer to the substantive results of
the bargaining. If not, it may review the substantive results de novo. The overall effect is to limit judicial
interference in qualifying federalism bargaining while retaining judicial oversight for bargaining abuses.
Second, it offers needed theoretical justification for the valid constitutional work that qualifying
federalism bargaining has long provided. By clarifying the connection between federalism values and
governance procedure, it provides the missing constitutional basis for arguments from political safeguards
proponents that the judiciary should refrain from second-guessing political allocations of contested
authority in contexts of overlap.167 Nevertheless, by procedurally differentiating between negotiated
governance that warrants deference and that which does not, it preserves at least some role for the judicial
review championed by judicial safeguards proponents.168 In this regard, it strikes a pose of measured
balance within the federalism safeguards debate, one made possible by recognizing the broader ways in
which judicial, legislative, and executive interpreters on both sides of the state-federal divide contribute.
Drawing on the procedural application of fair bargaining and federalism values, negotiated
governance thus opens possibilities for filling interpretive gaps in realms of doctrinal indeterminacy.
Indeed, it has been doing so all along. But for the first time, this analysis provides theoretical basis for
the actual practice of American federalism in clearer constitutional terms. It offers the missing
justification for operative political safeguards while preserving a role for limited judicial review. It
creates legitimate regulatory space for bilateral and accountable allocations of authority in zones of
overlap, balancing values, governmental capacity, and local-national input just as federalism requires.
Conclusion
I conclude by clarifying what I’ve tried to accomplish in this simplified discussion. My first
objective was to identify the fundamental tensions within American federalism that lead to so much
violation. Otherwise, however, judicial review should be limited to scrutiny of the bargaining process
against fair bargaining and federalism principles, deferring to results in a procedural analog to rational basis
review. This enables an interpretive partnership between the political and judicial branches that harnesses
what each best contributes to federalism implementation while honoring the premise of Marbury v.
Madison.
Id. (citations omitted).
165
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006).
166
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). See also RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten (“New Governance scholars have
also proposed theories of judicial review that position courts to monitor and incentivize problem-solving processes,
rather than adjudicate substantive disputes. Review of bargaining autonomy, interest literacy, and faithful
representation would rely on familiar judicial tools from contract law, agency law, and due process interpretation,
and courts could draw from established federalism jurisprudence and scholarship in articulating the tests for
procedural consistency with federalism values.”) (citations omitted).
167
RYAN, supra note 1, at Chapter Ten. See also Chapter Eight (discussing the federalism safeguards debate). For
examples of literature from the political safeguards school, see supra note 35.
168
Id. at Chapters Ten and Eight (as above). For examples of literature from the judicial safeguards school, see
supra note 34.
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controversy in the political sphere. By virtue of its flexible but indeterminate design, American
federalism will always struggle with the intrinsic competition among its underlying values of checks and
balances, accountability and transparency, local innovation and interjurisdictional competition, and
interjurisdictional problem-solving synergy. It will always struggle to balance the roles of the three
branches of government in interpreting the Constitution’s federalism directives. And of course,
federalism is, by definition, a struggle for balance between local and national wisdom in implementing
the ideals of good governance.
As outlined in Part I, these ongoing struggles are the once and future challenges of American
federalism. The U.S. federal system has been grappling with these challenges since its formative years, as
evidenced during the eighteenth century debates of the Constitutional Convention and the precursor
Articles of Confederation. They were front and center during the nation’s greatest moment of crisis, the
nineteenth century Civil War. Our federal system heaved and shifted again to adjust for these tensions
during critical moments of the twentieth century, including the Great Depression and the attacks of 9/11.
At the turn of the new century, the United States is again embroiled in federalism controversies over the
reach of federal authority and the resilience of state alternatives. Over this period, scholars and jurists
have turned to successive and competing theories of federalism to make sense of these challenges. To the
same end, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN proposes a theory of Balanced Federalism that
accounts for these internal tensions and reconnects normative federalism theory with a more theorized
understanding of actual federalism practice, merging elements from its predecessors with new insights.169
Drawing from the Balanced Federalism analysis, I then introduced the growing enterprise of
state-federal intergovernmental bargaining as one response to federalism’s ongoing challenges in an age
of increasing interconnectivity. In Part II, I introduced the zones of jurisdictional overlap that complicate
federalism theory, and I highlighted the significance of bilaterally negotiated governance to the overall
discourse and the federalism safeguards debate that has long focused only on unilateral activity. Part III
outlined the basic categories of negotiated federalism and demonstrated its mechanisms with two
examples of regulatory laws that create forums for genuine state-federal joint policymaking negotiation.
The prevalence of negotiated federalism undermines a stale, tacitly adversarial assumption on which too
much of the American federalism discourse is predicated. It also highlights opportunities for the
development of tailored forms of intergovernmental bargaining to address the regulatory challenges that
arise in interjurisdictional contexts.
Finally, in Part IV, I sketched a bold claim about the interpretive potential of bargaining that is
procedurally consistent with the principles of fair bargaining and federalism. When state and federal
actors resolve federalism dilemmas through processes consistent with these criteria, I argue that they are
negotiating the answer to federalism’s fundamental question—who gets to decide?—in a manner that
vindicates constitutional goals. Negotiated results that are challenged on federalism grounds warrant
judicial deference to the extent they satisfy the requisite criteria. Meanwhile, executive and legislative
actors can use the criteria identified here to better engineer procedural regard for federalism values into
the bargaining processes they employ, improving governance more generally.
This conception of negotiated federalism showcases one application of the fuller Balanced
Federalism theory set forth in the book. When it meets the requisite criteria, intergovernmental
bargaining can facilitate rational balancing among the competing values of good governance at the heart
of American federalism. It effectively leverages the distinct functional capacities of the three branches in
169

See generally RYAN, supra note 1.
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interpreting federalism directives, harnessing the best of legislative ingenuity, executive expertise, and
judicial neutrality. And it maximizes the balanced input of local and national actors beyond the
conventional political safeguards of unilateral governance. The proposal for measured judicial deference
to qualifying federalism bargaining draws on the insights of the political safeguards school by respecting
political federalism determinations that incorporate state and local perspectives. Simultaneously, it draws
on the instincts of the judicial safeguards school in preserving a limited role for courts to police for
abuses. The tailored dialectic between judicial and political safeguards draws on legislative and executive
decision-making where the political branches are most able, backstopped by judicial review of the right
issues.
Negotiated governance is hardly the only point of interest in modern American federalism, which
continues to grapple with federalism’s core challenges on all dimensions, unilateral as well as bilateral,
substantive as well as procedural. Nevertheless, effective intergovernmental bargaining is increasingly
used to cut through the fiery federalism debates that threaten to paralyze regulatory initiative and punish
interjurisdictional collaboration. Better understanding of this realm of federalist governance is a critical
new development in federalism theory, warranting attention and future study.
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